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Between Nationalism, Modernism and
Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of
‘Alevi Identities’
TALHA KOSE
This study discusses the position of Alevi identity and the Alevi community with
regard to the Kemalist national identity-building project. This well recognized proj-
ect aimed to create an ethnically homogenous Turkish nation and religiously local
and ‘non-political’ understanding and practice of a Turkish Islam that could be cen-
trally controlled and monitored by the bureaucratic establishment. Popular Alevi
narratives in early Republican history, including the period of the Milli M€ucadele
(National Struggle) (1919–46), have led to an unsettled debate about Alevi identity
and its relationship with Kemalist nation-building. According to some popular
narratives, Alevi citizens were an ideal fit for these projects. On the contrary, some
other Alevi narratives portrayed a completely different and more controversial pic-
ture of the Alevis and their relationship with the Kemalist state establishment. It is
vital to understand this relationship to see into the position of Alevi citizens
vis-a-vis the Turkish state establishment and Sunni citizens in the contemporary con-
text. This study takes this complicated relationship as its topic of discussion.
Alevi identity politics has attracted less attention in academic and policy circles in
comparison to the Kurdish issue and the secular and conservative/pro-Islamist divide
in Turkey. Alevi identity-based claims such as the status of Alevi religious places,
cemevis,1 or compulsory religious education and the burgeoning literature on Alevi
culture and history do not necessarily serve the comprehension of the dynamics and
the fragmented nature of the Alevi issue as an identity-based problem. Most impor-
tantly, the position and relations of the Alevi community with the Kemalist state
establishment during the single-party era is virtually a mystery.
It would be misleading to characterize the pre-19902 period of Alevi identity poli-
tics as a history of complete peace and quiet marked by a lack of activism. Up until
the late 1980s, Alevi identity politics were shaped in response to the major social and
political processes of top-down nation building, laicization efforts of the Turkish
state establishment, the processes of modernization, and urbanization and immigra-
tion starting from the late 1950s. The relatively stable political environment of the
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single-party era (1923–46) and the volatile social, economic and political environ-
ment of the late 1950s affected the organizational approaches and political language
of Alevi activists.
Contrary to the commonly held belief, Alevis have not really enjoyed any specific
social, economic and political privileges during the Republican era. Alevis were also
the subjects of homogenization and assimilation policies during the Republican
nation-building process. This situation concerning Alevis in the social, economic and
political spheres continued during the Republican era as well. It would be perfectly
accurate to claim that Alevi identity did not match the Republican notion of an ‘ideal
citizen’, who can be depicted as ethnically Turkish (preferably from the Balkan
peninsula); religiously Muslim, in terms of understanding and practising the Hanefi
sect of Sunni Islam;3 and secular and westernized4 in terms of religious practice and
worldview. The wide majority of Alevis were ethnically Turkish and their worldview
and religious practices were close to the secular and non-political local Islam, yet
they also ‘strayed’ from the ‘imagined ideal Turk’. Alevis passively supported the
Republican laicization reforms despite the closing of Bektas¸i lodges (13 December
1925) along with other laicization reforms and the Dersim Events of 1937–38.5
The ‘Alevi Issue’ is one of Turkey’s most contradictory and commonly misunder-
stood identity-based problems. Confusion about the features of Alevi identity poli-
tics is mainly due to two reasons. First, this confusion is related to the ambiguous
nature and character of the Alevi identity. Whether the Alevi identity is an ethnic,
sectarian, religious or political identity is a matter of debate within the Alevi commu-
nity. Different Alevi groups prefer to define themselves in different terms ranging
from ‘a sectarian group’, ‘an ethnic group’, ‘true humanists’ and ‘a faith-based social
movement’ to ‘enlightened Muslims’ or ‘true Muslims’.6 The second confusion is
related to the Alevis’ complicated and unsteady relationship with the Kemalist
nation-building project and the majority Sunni citizens in Turkey. Many people,
including some members of the Alevi elite, consider the Alevi community’s relation-
ship with the Kemalist state establishment as stable, consistent and positive.7 This
relationship with Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalist establishment during the single-
party era (1919–46) was even depicted as the golden age of convergence. There are
popular discourses that characterize the Alevis as the ‘watch-guards’ or ‘defenders’
of the ‘Kemalist Regime’.
There was a partial compatibility between the Kemalist objective of laicization
and nation building and the Alevi practice and understanding of a ‘local’ and ‘non-
political’ version of ‘Turkish Islam’. The Kemalist project of laicism was not a non-
religious or irreligious8 project of broader secularism. The objective of Kemalist
laicism was to place an institutionalized state control over religion.9 The Kemalist
project tried to reinstitute the ‘high Islam’10 under the tutelage of the state. In com-
parison to the ‘folk Islam’,11 the notion of ‘high Islam’ was more compatible with the
modernist premises of Kemalism. The institutions of control were shaped according
to Orthodox Sunni tradition rather than the heterodox and non-scriptural Alevi tra-
dition. Besides these incompatibilities, Alevis were also faced with the challenges of
nation building and homogenization policies that involved homogenization in ethnic,
religious and sectarian domains. Ethnically and linguistically, the majority of Alevis
are Turkish speaking and of Turk/Turcoman origin12 and therefore they have
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not faced the challenges of ethnic homogenization as much as the Kurmanji- and
Zazaki- (Kirmanjki/Dimilki-)13 speaking Kurdish Alevis of Eastern Anatolia.
Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking, ethnically Kurdish/Zaza Alevis of Tunceli (Dersim)
and Eastern Anatolia had a completely different experience during the project of cen-
tralization and ethnic homogenization. The Koc¸giri (1920–21) and Dersim rebellions
(1937–38) were the consequences of serious ethnic/sectarian tensions that ended in
violent confrontations. The Kurdish/Zaza Alevis of Eastern Anatolia also resisted
the centralization efforts of the Republican establishment.
The idea of ‘Alevism as local Islam’ dates back to the late Ottoman era. The Young
Turks era and CUP (Community of Union and Progress – 1908–18) administration
led to a considerable easing of Alevi–state relations because of the secular nationalist
orientations of their ideology. Some high-ranking members of the CUP, such as
Enver and Talat Pasha, were said to be Bektas¸i,14 Shaykh al-Islam Musa Kazım,
Kazım Karabekir, Kazım €Ozalp and Mehmet Ali Ayni were also connected to the
Bektas¸i order.15
The CUP had the aim of accelerating the process of the secularization of the state,
thus limiting the influence of the orthodox Islamic establishment. It tried to gain the
support of the groups that were marginalized by Abdulhamit II’s (1876–1909) pan-
Islamist policies.16 The CUP idealized the Alevis as ‘authentic Turks’. Preserving
national Turkish culture and religion against foreign (Arabic) influences was one of
the objectives of the CUP.17 According to Kieser, ‘for the first time since the Kızılbas¸
revolts in the sixteenth century the watershed of 1908 led the Alevis to an open and
collective reaffirmation of their identity’.18 Kieser defines this period as the ‘Alevi
renaissance’;19 Alevis had suddenly turned into actors in the politics of the late
Ottoman period.
The loss of the Balkans and other Muslim provinces of the Ottoman Empire after
the First World War and the emergence of nationalist movements such as Albanian
and Arab nationalisms necessitated the emphasis on national symbols and ties.
References to Central Asian culture and religions were important for the construc-
tion of the Turkish national identity and those references were more visible in the cul-
tural practices of the Alevi community. Baha Sait, who started his research on the
Kızılbas¸ and Alevis during the CUP period, had a positive perspective on Alevis.20
Baha Sait’s was from a nationalist point of view and he described Alevi–Bektas¸i cul-
ture as the authentic Turkish culture, which remained unspoiled by cosmopolitan
ideals and Arab culture.21
The Turks that are devoted to their customs and their nation could not get used
to a language that was complicated by mixed origins. The transnational ideals
of the Arabs did not match with the national ideals of the Turks. Those ideals
will never come together. For this reason, the purest of Turks, the Turcomans,
Nomads and most intelligent and the brightest Turks, while looking for a place
where they would feel freedom, decided to get into Alevi tekkes. They knew that
there was national freedom in those places.22
Baha Sait’s and the nationalist point of view became more relevant after the estab-
lishment of the Turkish Republic23 and the abolition of the caliphate. However, the
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search for authenticity in Central Asian Turkic culture did not work and was
replaced by a new search based on the Anatolian cultures and civilizations. During
the process of creating a Turkish nation in late Ottoman and early Republican
Turkey, the Alevi Bektas¸i understanding of Islam was highlighted: ‘The customs and
ways of life of this community are the same as the customs of the Oguz (Turcomans),
and the Shaman Turcoman canvas.’24
The ethnic origins of Alevi identity (Turkish) and the relationship of this identity
to pre-Islamic Turkish culture were appreciated by the official identity because those
sources contributed to the official Turkish historical narrative. However, the
religious dimension of Alevi identity was not recognized by the official ideology.
This paradoxical situation puts both the Turkish state and Alevi identity in an
ambiguous relationship. As a result, one of the consistent features of the Alevi com-
munities during the Ottoman and Seljukid empires was to resist the political centre
throughout the centuries. The Turkish state had not trusted the Alevis as the con-
structive element of Turkish national identity, nor had the Alevis abandoned their
ethnic and communal allegiances for the sake of the secular civic national identity.
During the early years of the Turkish Republic, some Kurdish and Zaza Alevi tribes
had joined the Koc¸giri (6 March–17 June 1921) and Dersim (1937–38) rebellions.25
Although these uprisings were mainly linked with Kurdish ethno-nationalism, tribal
ties and the Alevi connection were effective in the mobilization of the people.26 There
was a definite sense of discontentment in the entire Dersim region toward the nation-
alistic policies of the CUP, which was wary of a possible Kızılbas¸–Armenian alliance
and rebellion.27 Mutual mistrust of the state and Kurdish-Zaza Alevis continued
even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
The Alevi dimension of the argument by itself cannot fully explain the nature of
the discontentment and the mobilization against the Republic.28 It also cannot
explain the allegiance and support for Republican values. Alevis had sympathized
with some values, principles and laws, whereas they had been highly critical of
others, as had the other identity groups in Turkey. Sometimes the values, principles
and laws they had shared with the state contradicted those of other groups. For
instance, the principle of secularism was not common ground between Kurdish
Alevis and Islamist Kurds. Furthermore, the principle of nationalism was not com-
mon ground between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis. These overlapping, crosscutting
and sometimes contradicting ideological and value-oriented preferences and priori-
ties had also turned into constant tensions among the communities.
It is distinctive in the case of Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking Alevis in the Dersim
region and the Islamist Kurds that they were much more distant and they felt much
more marginalized and disenfranchised than any other groups among the Muslim
populations of the Republic of Turkey. These groups had either been forced to inte-
grate or had been subdued by force. Some of the tribes were also forced to migrate to
other parts of Turkey, especially to western regions. Neither of these ‘solutions’ was
helpful for creating a sense of belonging or any further commonality.
Kurmanji/Zaaki-speaking Alevis of Eastern Anatolia were torn between their reli-
gious and ethnic loyalties.29 The question was whether to support the secular Turkish
Republic or to initiate a struggle that would claim broader political autonomy. In the
latter case they would not have been supported by the Sunni Kurdish groups which
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were also requesting increased autonomy yet did not share the religious beliefs of
Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking Alevis. They might not be supported by the Turkish
Alevis as well because of the Bektas¸i leaders’ and Turcoman Alevis’ support for the
‘Milli M€ucadele’ and, later on, for Atat€urk’s project of the modern Turkish Repub-
lic. The second option was to support the Kurdish ethno-national/ethno-separatist
movement. In that case there was a possibility that they might have been a minority
within a broader Sunni-Kurdish entity due to their beliefs. A Kurdish nationalist
entity might be more conservative in terms of its religious beliefs and values than
a secular Republic. Sectarian ties together with the tribal ties were especially effective
in the mobilization of the people of Dersim. The Sheyh Said rebellion (1925) had a
Kurdish Islamic character and was not supported by Alevi groups. This manifested
the religious and sectarian nature of these mass mobilizations.
During early 1920s the Alevi tribes of Zaza and those of Kurdish ethnicity were
undecided whether to support Turkish or Kurdish ethno-nationalism.30 Some of the
groups decided to support Kurdish ethno-nationalism, whereas some other Alevi
tribes decided to support the Turkish state that promised to create a modern secular
nation. This was particularly due to the hostile feelings held by Alevi Kurds against
Sunni Kurds whose views were considered to be fundamentalist, and who denied
their Alevi identity.31 During the Sivas Congress of 4–11September 1919 the leaders
of the Kurdish Alevi Koc¸giri tribe called for an autonomous government under the
Ottoman Federation. The Alevi Kurdish tribes of Koc¸giri had not recognized the
authority of the leadership of Atat€urk.32 The Koc¸giri revolts had not found enough
support from the other Kurdish tribes because they were Alevis and the Alevi tribes
had not supported them because they were rebelling in favour of the Kurdish cause.
The Koc¸giri revolt was suppressed without difficulty and the leader of the rebellion,
Alis¸er Bey, was executed. It was a Kurdish Alevi revolt in which some Turkish Alevi
villages and a few Armenians took part. Neither Kurdish nor Turkish Sunnis were
involved in the Koc¸giri revolts.33 In his report, which is addressed to Minister of For-
eign Affairs Lord Curzon, British High Commissioner Sir Horace Rumbold
described the uprising as an ‘anti-Kemalist uprising’ which did not extend beyond
the Alevi Kurds of the Dersim region.34 Kieser argues that ‘the Koc¸giri movement
displayed anything but cohesive Alevi support for the national war of independence’,
as emphasized by some Alevi authors particularly since the 1960s.35
The ethno-sectarian revolts of the early Republican era were serious threats to the
young Turkish Republic, in particular to the Kurdish/Zaza Alevis’ resistance to the
Republican regime’s central control attempts that had led to the Dersim Revolt.
In the popular narratives of the ethnic Turkish Alevis, the Dersim rebellion is consid-
ered to be the struggle of the feudal lords of Dersim against the Turkish state; there-
fore the rebellion is not even partially supported.36 The traumatic memory of the
bloody repression of the Dersim Revolt still generates bitter feelings among Kurdish-
Zaza Alevis.
The leader of the Dersim Revolt, Seyit Rıza, was a religious Kurdish leader as well
as the chief of the Abbasus¸agı tribe. Five other tribes of the region had joined the
rebellion.37 Seyit Rıza and his 50 men were caught, and Rıza was executed with 11 of
his men.38 Many of the accounts related to the Dersim events have been based on
Nuri Dersimi’s book. He was also involved in the early stages of the rebellion and
escaped to Syria.39 In these accounts the rebellion was presented as a heroic Kurdish
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nationalist struggle. According to official records, 10 per cent of the entire popula-
tion of Tunceli died.40 Many of the rebellious tribes were later exiled to other parts
of Turkey. The Dersim rebellion shows more of the signs of traditional tribal resis-
tance to government interference than a modern struggle for a separate state.41
Seyit Rıza’s last words before his execution have often been presented as proof of
the sectarian nature of the rebellions. ‘We are descendants of Karbala [symbolic
reference to Shia and Alevi martyrdom]. We have nothing to be ashamed of. This is
shameful. This is cruelty. This is murder’ (‘Evladı Kerbalayıh. Bihatayıh. Ayıptır.
Zul€umd€ur. Cinayettir’).42
It is not clear whether these words were intended to make a sectarian statement
based on Alevi identity, or to present the plight of Rıza and his people regarding the
continuation of the Karbala Massacre of 680 AD. In any case, he draws parallels
between the attacks of the Turkish military and Yezit’s armies,43 which were suffered
equally by both Alevi and Sunni communities in Turkey.
In the contemporary Alevi revival there are many references to the Dersim rebel-
lions of 1937–38. While political activists and ex-socialist and Marxist Alevis under-
line those rebellions as an example of the Turkish state’s oppressive attitude and
assimilationist policies towards Alevis, more pro-regime Alevis consider these rebel-
lions to be tribal and ethnic rebellions that had nothing to do with the progressive
and democratic ideals of the Alevi worldview.
Different Alevi groups, especially Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking Alevis of East
Anatolian and the Turcoman origin (C¸epni, Tahtacı, Y€or€uk, Sırac¸, etc.) have diverse
views about Dersim. For some Alevis, Seyit Rıza is glorified as a heroic figure like
Shah Ismail and P^ır Sultan Abdal, who were considered to be defenders of social jus-
tice and the rights of the Alevi people. Some groups, on the other hand, consider him
to be merely a tribal leader, yet they appreciate his courage and nobility. Though
highly controversial, Seyit Rıza is an important figure in Alevi iconography.
It should be pointed out that the Koc¸giri and Dersim rebellions took place
during Atat€urk’s era.44 Supporting them also meant supporting the rebellion against
Atat€urk and the Republican reforms. Especially in the post-1960 context, for many
Alevis it is not acceptable to resist Atat€urk’s reforms, the most important being
laicism. Historically, it may be correct to argue that some Alevis might sympathize
with the Dersim and Koc¸giri revolts, yet many Alevis do not want to be associated
with it for the sake of contemporary Alevi identity politics. Atat€urk is a more
important constructive figure and hero for the contemporary Alevi identity than
any other rebellious figures in the normative reading of Alevi history. Ethno-
sectarian tensions and violent confrontations with the Kurdish/Zaza Alevis of the
Dersim Region had led to wide-scale mandatory population transfers from that
region to other parts of Turkey, further complicating the demographic structure of
Alevi communities.
Rather than creating a completely ‘non-religious’ society and secularist state, the
Republican model of laicism tried to redraw the boundaries of Islam and create a
sterilized Turkish Islam with its own institutions and vision.45 This vision had two
main orientations. First and foremost, the Republican establishment tried to create a
‘local’ Turkish Islam that was completely ‘apolitical’ at the popular level. In addi-
tion, this vision of Islam was meant to exclude the ‘low Islam’ or ‘Sufi Islam’46 and
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to accommodate the Diyanet _I s¸leri Bas¸kanlıgı (Administration of Religious Affairs
–Diyanet) as the institution of Turkish ‘high Islam’. Consistent with modernization
and centralization policies, the Republican establishment tried to keep a firm grip on
peripheral religious communities and networks. The Diyanet was designed to be the
only central religious authority restricting communal-level religious networks. While
the first of these orientations matched the Alevi worldview, the second orientation
excluded Alevis as members of a heterodox community. This specific form of laiciza-
tion made neither the Sunni cemaats and tariqats nor the Alevi communities happy.
Conservative Sunni communities had managed to adjust themselves to the modern
environment; they created new civic institutions and modern networks in urban con-
texts. Sunni citizens also benefited from the services of the Diyanet. On the other
hand, having lost their fundamental institutions of Bektas¸i lodges because of the
Republican law that banned tekkes and zaviyes, Alevis felt more pressure to adapt
themselves to the modern context. The heterodox and historically anti-establishment
position of Alevi tradition was a major predicament for the maintenance of Alevi cul-
ture and identity in the modern context.
Alevis were at the margins of the ‘ideal definition of Turkish citizen’. Like many
other identity groups, they were also subject to homogenization and assimilation pol-
icies. On the other hand, the Alevi understanding and practice of Islam was more
compatible with the Republican ideal of a ‘secularized’ and ‘local’ form of ‘Turkish
Folk Islam’. The Alevi way of life, with its emphasis on correct conduct, responsibil-
ity to the community, and the performance of collective music, poetry, dance and
songs was compatible with the Kemalist Republican vision of secular/national
morality.47 To a certain extent, this compatibility created a form of mutual sympathy
between Alevi citizens and the Kemalist bureaucratic establishment. The problem
with the pragmatic references to Alevism was that, even though in terms of lifestyle,
worldview and understanding of Islam, Alevism fits into the official project of secu-
larization better than some of the politicized versions of Sunnism, ‘the Turkish state
establishment wants Alevis to become Sunnis; per contra, the establishment expects
Sunnis to understand and practice Islam like Alevis’.48 The famous Turkish journal-
ist and novelist Ahmet Altan’s depiction of the Turkish state’s perception of Alevis
and conservative Sunnis is quite informative about the paradoxes of Turkish secular-
ism. The Turkish state establishment has never trusted Alevi communities in Anato-
lia because of the Anatolian folk rebellions, Ottoman–Safavid conflicts and leftist
orientations of Alevis starting from 1960s.
Since the early days of the Turkish Republic, the state adopted the project of
creating a homogeneous and centrally controlled understanding of Islam.49
According to _Ismail Kara, as an overall policy the Diyanet’s attempts to restrict
popular folk rituals and popular religious practices have been influenced from
the nineteenth century by positivism, Protestantism and Salafism.50 Concepts
like ‘irtica’ (retrogression) were created to deter Sunni religious groups from
getting involved in politics.
The abolition of the caliphate, the Ministry of Islamic Law and Pious Foundations
(S¸er’iye ve Evkaf Veka^leti) and madrasas, and the creation of a unified education sys-
tem (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) in the early years of the Turkish Republic did not completely
clear Islam out of the public sphere. Instead, the regime ‘created a new structure of
control and oversight between the state and Islam in which the Republic’s founders
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sought to use the powers of the state to interpret, oversee, and administer (including
financially) religious doctrine and practice’.51 Most Alevis criticized the state-
sponsored and -monitored administration of religious services; they consider this
contradictory to the principle of ‘laicism’ (laicite).
The Alevi understanding of Islam has been presented as more humane, demo-
cratic, egalitarian, humanist, secular and non-fundamentalist, as opposed to
‘fundamentalist influenced Sunnism’ or ‘Islamism’. Both the worldviews and the
social and political orientations of Alevis and the ‘guardians of the Kemalist official
ideology’ converged in the early Republican era. However the political purposes of
the ‘Turkish Islam’ or ‘local Islam/ folk Islam’ model do not match with the ‘political
Alevism’, which is in the social and political domains; some of the narratives that
had been popularized by the discourse of ‘local Islam’ or ‘Turkish Islam’ helped the
legitimization and popularization of arguments Alevis use in their struggle for
recognition.
In contrast to the Ottoman past, loyalties of Alevi citizens to the Republican
regime increased with the reforms of secularization. The loyalties of diverse groups
and the social control and oversight of them hung in a delicate balance for the
Turkish state establishment. This delicate dynamic had a strong influence on the pro-
gression of Alevi identity politics. Thus, Alevi identity politics were caught between
contradictory orientations. Because of their secular sensitivities, Alevis were consid-
ered the ‘watch guards’ of the regime against the Islamic-oriented social and political
groups and communities. They were suspected by the bureaucratic establishment of
being Soviet or Communist proteges during the 1960s and 1970s because of their left-
ist political orientations.52
The project of Turkish secularism failed to create a ‘Turkish Islam’ that would sat-
isfy both Alevi and Sunni citizens. In reality, one of the essential pillars of Alevi iden-
tity politics was to challenge the religious establishment that is represented by the
Diyanet, Imam Hatip Schools and compulsory religious courses. Despite its having
many common features, the Alevi understanding of Islam was not the panacea for
the Republican ambition of a centrally organized, officially controlled and moni-
tored, apolitical, local Islam.
Mustafa Kemal’s idea of Turkish nationalism was a mixture of ethnic and territorial
nationalisms.53 The territory was to be essentially Anatolia. However, the ‘natural
boundaries of the Turkish nation were to be equated roughly to the militarily defen-
sible Anatolian heartland’.54 The concept of ‘Turkishness’ according to Kemalist
nationalism was based on the complex juxtaposition of territory, religion and ethnic-
ity.55 The territorial limits of the Turkish nation included Anatolia and Thrace.56
Ethnic Turks of Central Asia and Turkish-speaking Shiite Muslims of Azerbaijan
and Iran were not encouraged to immigrate to Anatolia.57 Loyalty to the Anatolian
homeland and the ‘Turkish nation’ that inhabits this homeland is one of the funda-
mental tenets of the Turkish national identity.58 The narrative of a common home-
land was a valuable asset for the Turkish bureaucracy in maintaining the loyalties of
Alevi citizens, since many Alevis had strong emotional and cultural attachments to
the Anatolian homeland. In addition to the notion of common homeland, the found-
ing narrative of the Republic of Turkey, ‘Milli M€ucadele’ (national struggle), por-
trayed the population features of the new Turkish Republic. The groups that
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participated in the ‘Milli M€ucadele’ were multi-ethnic (Turks, Kurds, Zaza, Laz,
Azari, Tatar and Albanian) but mono-religious.59 According to Akt€urk, the ‘milli’
(national) of the ‘Milli M€ucadele’ (national struggle) was based on religion, rather
than being a nationality based on common ethnicity.60 In the early periods of the
Turkish Republic, the common bond of the Turkish nation was religion, which
reformists were trying to transform dramatically to constitute a civic nation based
on secular, western values.
The unity we are determined to form does not include only the Turks or Circas-
sian; it is a unity that comprises all the Islamic elements. I would request to
emphasize this way of understanding and to prevent all other
misunderstandings.61
The objective of the modern Republican nation-building project was broader than
creating a territorial homeland; the project intended to create a new state within the
‘militarily defensible territories’, with its modern secular62 institutions as well as a
modern society.63 Ethnic, sectarian and religiously oriented differences and affilia-
tions would eventually become irrelevant if this enlightenment-guided top-down
social and political master plan was successful. In this paradigm, traditional and eth-
nic loyalties and values of communal groups like Circassians, Kurds, Alevis, Tatars,
tribes and conservative religious groups (tariqats) were impediments to the Kemalist
modern enlightenment notion of the future. Alevis, who suffered social, economic
and sectarian persecution and oppression during the last three centuries of the Otto-
man era because of their syncretistic and heterodox belief system, were excited about
this new modern, secular project. The Turkish Alevi community appeared to have
been supportive of Kemalism mainly because of the secular nature of the new
regime.64 However, the traditional religious loyalties of Alevis were also a threat to
the ideal vision of a modern Turkish national identity.
The Turkish nationalist movement starting from the late Ottoman period identi-
fied itself with Turkish-speaking Muslims, predominantly the ‘secularist oriented
Muslims of the Balkan peninsula’.65 Nominally, they were the Sunni-Muslims of the
Hanafi sect. Forcibly or voluntarily, many Turks and Muslims migrated to Turkey
from the Balkans, from the Balkan Wars (1912) to the late 1920s.66 Religion and
language played important roles in the incorporation of the immigrants into the
‘Turkish nation’.67 Religion did not play a similar consolidative role in incorporating
Alevis into the national identity of the Republic of Turkey. It was the Republican
ideal and the promise of a secularized society, rather than the imagined religious
common ground, which played a key role in incorporating Alevis into the Republi-
can social and political order.
The ideal practical definition of Turkish citizenship was based on the implicit crite-
ria of being ‘Turkish speaking, preferably from the Balkans’. Kurds, Islamists and
conservative Sunnis and Alevis, especially Kurdish and Zaza Alevis (dimili),
remained at the margins of this ideal definition. On the other hand, the nominal defi-
nition of Islam was based on the Hanafi-Sunni68 understanding of Islam, which was
also represented in the Diyanet.
As the majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey follows the Shafi version of
Sunni Islam, even the Shafis have felt marginalized by some of the practices of the
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Diyanet until very recently. Regarding the Alevis, on the other hand, although the
vast majority of the Alevi population does not have any problem with the Islamic
roots of their identity, the Diyanet’s attitude and policies towards them has not been
embracing. Alevis do not want to be homogenized under the Sunni/Hanafi rubric of
Islam. Therefore, the Alevis regard the ‘99 per cent Muslim’ narrative as part of an
assimilation project; they want their differences to be recognized.
With the intent to ethnically and religiously homogenize Turkish society,
the meaning of ‘Muslim’ was stripped of its political and cultural connotations.69
Traditional religious authorities and communal religious leaders were de-legitimized
and a ‘progressive’ and individualist form of Islam was adopted. Thus, Islam turned
into a nominal category of belonging within the context of the Kemalist identity-
building project. In an attempt to distance itself from the Ottoman legacy, Kemalist
discourse focused on ‘Turkishness’ rather than Islam as the core of Republican iden-
tity. However, Islam is considered to be an essential element of Turkish identity,
which is also limited to the Anatolian region.
The broader common ground for the Republican identity was religion, rather than
shared ethnicity. The contents of this new Turkish ethnicity had been reconfigured
through new narratives on Turkish language and Turkish history.70 An interpreta-
tion of Islam had not been granted to any groups by the Turkish state and the official
hegemonic definition attempted to transform the other Sunni groups’ understanding
of Islam. Though Alevis had been supportive of the laicization policies of the Turkish
Republic they also wanted to be recognized as a different yet equally legitimate
Islamic group in Turkey. The hegemonic and culturally exclusionary definition of
official Islam did not give such a privilege to any groups.71
A paradoxical situation for the creation of modern secular identity was that the
state establishment wanted to exclude religion and other communal identities from
politics, while it also tried to promote a particular religious identity as a means of
promoting cultural and social solidarity. Cultural sources and ritual practices of
Sunni Islam are important components of the Turkish national culture, that is why
those practices and cultural sources had also been incorporated into secular Turkish
culture. Many Alevis had felt that their cultural practices and way of interpreting
Islam had been denied by the Diyanet,72 which they considered the fundamental
institution of Sunni understanding of Islam in Turkey. The content of the religion
was restructured according to the needs of the Kemalist regime.
Rather than excluding religion from society, we should let it live under the com-
mand of reforms. We cannot reach our objectives by demolishing or abandoning
the mosques or building people’s houses (halkevleri) in their place.73
By this means, the Turkish state facilitated, monitored and constrained certain
religious activities. Despite the secularist political environment, the peripheral posi-
tion of the Alevi understanding of Islam continued during the Republican era as
well.74 According to Parla and Davison, ‘Kemalists not only subordinated religion
to the state, they also used and manipulated religion in the correct Kemalist Sunni
Orthodox version of Islam for their purposes’.75 Thus the system of religious educa-
tion and religious institutions is shaped along this manipulative perspective.
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The position and experiences of Alevis with regard to the secularization reforms
were diametrically opposite to those of conservative Sunnis and Kurdish citizens.
As the Kemalist secularization reforms succeeded, Alevi citizens’ attachment to
the regime strengthened, whereas conservative Sunni citizens felt threatened by
the reforms of top-down laicization. Rather than creating a homogeneous and
well-integrated definition of ‘us’, or a ‘Turkish nation’, this policy ended up generat-
ing a divided society where the old and new identities saw each other in antagonistic
and dialectic ways. The notions of a shared homeland, a common ethos and found-
ing narratives were unable to create an overarching bond between ‘marginalized’ citi-
zens, such as Kurds, Alevis, Islamists and conservative Islamic groups which made
very little or no effort to empathize with each other’s marginalization and sufferings.
The Republican nation-building project had an implicit model of an ideal Turkish
citizen, and Alevi identity was not a match to this model. Alevis neither actively
resisted nor supported the homogenization policies of the Republican identity-
building project, yet their traditional loyalties were considered as an impediment to
the official identity-building process.
Atat€urk’s image is one of the fundamental pillars of the modern Alevi identity. At the
present time, it is difficult to imagine an Alevi identity without the image of Atat€urk
because many Alevi citizens are culturally and emotionally attached to Atat€urk’s per-
sonality and his vision of a modern, secular Turkey. Atat€urk photos and portraits
can be seen in Alevi public spaces as well as in Alevi citizens’ homes, together with
photos of Ali ibn Abu-Talib and Hacı Bektas¸ Veli, the founder of the Bektas¸i order.
For many Alevis, Atat€urk represents a leader who pledged to end the peripheral posi-
tion of Alevis and to move Alevi culture and identity to the centre of the Turkish
national identity. ‘He was a secular, modernist leader with revolutionary social and
economic views and he also challenged the Sunni religious orthodoxy.’76
In other words, for many Alevis Atat€urk represented the ideals and vision of the
Alevi community.
During the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal visited the Hacı
Bektas¸ Dergah (convent). On 23 December 1919, Kemal met with two leaders of
the order (postnis¸in) Cemalettin Efendi and (post) Salih Niyazi Baba.77 The Bektas¸i
leaders promised to support Mustafa Kemal and the War of Independence,78 and
made significant contributions during the war. After the War of Independence,
Alevi and Bektas¸i leaders joined the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM/
TGNP). When the TGNP was opened on 23 April 1920, Cemalettin C¸elebi served
as the Kırs¸ehir representative and deputy president. This gave the second most
important position to a Bektas¸i leader. In the first TGNP after the War of Indepen-
dence, there were 15 Alevi-Bektas¸i representatives from different cities and regions,
including the Dersim (Tunceli) deputies Diyab Aga and Hasan Hayri Bey.79
According to Yes¸ilyurt, there were 27 Alevi representatives in the first TGNP
among 436 total representatives and six of the Alevi representatives were Alevi-
Kurds from Dersim.80
Many Bektas¸is also took elite bureaucratic posts in the early years of the Turkish
Republic. This is another important reason why Alevi-Bektas¸is embraced the new
regime. However, it is also true that Alevi-Bektas¸is could not manage to transform
their peripheral position to become a more central element of the Turkish governing
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elite and society. Integration with the nation state meant abandoning the blood- and
tribe-oriented communal ties and religious-based organizations. On 20 November
1925, Law No. 677 was passed in the TGNP closing all tekkes (lodges) and zaviyes.
It was forbidden to use titles such as seyit, s¸eyh, baba, m€urs¸it, dede, c¸elebi and halife.
The fundamental institution of the Bektas¸i order was banned, a decision which
resulted in significant frustration among the Bektas¸is who had expected to be a cen-
tral element in the social and religious life of the new Republic.81
According to the popular belief of Alevis, Atat€urk’s plans to build a secular
nation were supported by Bektas¸is.82 Bektas¸is hoped that they would be exempt
from the prohibition of dervish orders. Some Bektas¸is also expected that, far from
abolishing the order, Bektas¸iism should be the religion of the whole Turkish peo-
ple.83 This form of Turkish Islam was considered to be a ‘better’ alternative to the
objectives of the Kemalist regime, but it was not a convincing alternative that
might have been embraced by the majority Sunni population. For Alevis who are
sympathetic to Atat€urk and the Kemalist reforms, Atat€urk’s cooperation with the
leading figures of the Bektas¸i order during the Turkish War of Independence and
the early years of the Republic was a ‘glorious event’.84 For some Alevis, this coop-
eration is considered to be similar to the Osman Gazi and Edebali synergy during
the establishment of the Ottoman state. The former represented the ‘sword’, the
latter the ‘soul and the identity’ of the Ottoman state. Many Alevis today claim
possession to Atat€urk’s reforms and the main principles of the Turkish Republic,
stating that these principles were already represented by the Alevi-Bektas¸i
principles and worldview.
According to popular Alevi narratives, Atat€urk was influenced by Alevi-Bektas¸i
teachings because he was in touch with Bektas¸i leaders when he was determining the
founding principles of the Turkish Republic.85
Alevis believe that Atat€urk was also Bektashi. However the registers that prove
Atat€urk was a Bektashi are too limited. Atat€urk was born in Selanik, which was
among the places under the effect of Bektashi Tekkes. It is said that his father,
Ali Rıza Bey, was Bektashi. . . . Whether Atat€urk was a Bektashi or not, it is
clear that he gained the support of Alevis with his thought on matters of free-
dom of religion and faith and his successive achievements.86
However, Mustafa Kemal’s alliance with the Bektas¸i fathers and the Alevi-Bektas¸i
community seems more likely to be a pragmatic than an ideological alliance. Atat€urk
did not refrain from closing the Bektas¸i lodges within the general agenda of the
secularization and centralization of the Republic of Turkey. As mentioned, on
20 November 1925, Law No. 677 was passed by the Turkish Grand National Assem-
bly closing all tekkes (lodges) and zaviyes.87 The Alevi-Bektas¸is did not perceive this
policy as a specific attack on their community and institutions. In fact, they argue
that this policy was helpful in closing a dysfunctional institution that was already
degenerated and had been administered by the Nakshbendi order after the closing of
the Janissary Corps and banning of the Bektas¸i order in 1826.88
The single-party period (1923–46) has often been referred to as the golden age of
the Turkish Republic in the narratives of Alevis that feel loyalty to Kemalism.89
Therefore, the Alevi groups that feel close to revolutionary Marxism, Kurdish
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ethno-nationalism90 and liberal democracy have a different and less sympathetic
view of that same period than the majority of the Alevis. The Alevi appreciation of
the single-party regime is not a well-established fact. This is rather a retrospective
interpretation of early Republican history. Alevis only had instrumental values in a
struggle to pacify or to contain Islamist and ultra-conservative groups in Turkey.
The Kemalist repression of conservative Sunnis did not necessarily have any direct
beneficial influence on the Alevis. Alevi author and politician Reha C¸amuroglu
defines the period as a romantic appreciation of Alevis without much real sub-
stance.91 Hamit Bozarslan also mentions that Kemalist anti-Sunnism was in no way
synonymous with Alevi emancipation.92 Alevis considered Kemalist ideology
socially and politically on their side, yet the Kemalist transformation was unable to
end the peripheral position of Alevis.
From the 1960s on, the alliance between Kemalism and Alevis was established
against political Sunnism (or centre-right parties) and this alliance has been
re-established and strengthened against a rising political Islam since the 1990s.
The Kemalist–Alevi relationship and proximity was rather re-interpreted and even
invented by the Turkish intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s.93 As the Sunni commu-
nities (cemaats and tariqats) supported right-wing politics, Alevis and left-wing
Kemalists started to get closer. Alevis interpreted Atat€urk as a revolutionary leader
who had resisted western imperialism and had won the struggle, whereas left-wing
Kemalists discovered Alevi-Kızılbas¸ culture to be a local resource for resistance and
revolution.94
The gradual concessions for Islamic activities in the public sphere, especially
the emergence of Islamist-oriented political parties; the growing influence of the
Diyanet in religious affairs; the spread of Imam Hatip Schools, which offer intensive
religious training; and the strengthening of Islamic communities and civil society
organizations have all led to deep disappointments for Alevis. These developments
contradicted the ‘tacit’ social and political contract between Alevis and the Kemalist
regime. Their contract was based on the ideal of a modern, secular and westernized
Turkish nation. Many Alevi felt increasingly threatened as the Turkish state estab-
lishment loosened its tight control on the communal and political representations
of Islam.
The mythic figure of Atat€urk and narratives related to Atat€urk’s personality and
social and political project are still the strongest ties that connect Alevi citizens to
the Kemalist Republican establishment. As members of a ‘minority sect’, in com-
parison to Sunnis, many Alevis are aware of the fact that Kemalist laicization poli-
cies situated them in a relatively better position in comparison to their position
during the Ottoman era, when they were completely marginalized and stigmatized
as a heterodox community. Even this change maintained Alevi appreciation and
support of the Kemalist reforms. Kemalist reforms are seen as barriers against the
return to the Ottoman legacy, which is represented in the Alevi public memory as a
period of marginalization, oppression and violence. Many Alevis often perceive
Islamists and conservative Sunni citizens in Turkey as the descendants of the Otto-
man legacy.
Alevis and Sunnis and Alevis and the Turkish bureaucratic establishment have a
complicated relationship that cannot be understood through a single storyline. In
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fact these relationships have been shaped in relation to the multiplicity of social and
political cleavages in Turkey. The Alevi lifestyle and worldview had certain compati-
bilities with the Kemalist nation-building and laicization project. However, their het-
erodox religious rituals and practices, their marginalized social and economic status,
and their distanced position vis-a-vis the political centre had fostered lasting scepti-
cism against and by the Alevis. The Kemalist identity-building project seemed to
embrace the local (Turkish) components of Alevi culture and the Alevi version of
Islam. Nonetheless this project institutionalized its own version of ‘high Islam’
through the institution of Diyanet.
Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking Alevis have a much more cynical and, to certain
extent, antagonistic vision of Republican Turkey in comparison to Turkish Ale-
vis.95 Neither nationalist nor the laicist principles and practices of Kemalism helped
to create affinity between them and the new regime. These unresolved identity
issues and social and political cleavages became more visible after the transition to
multi-party politics. Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking Alevis of Eastern Anatolia
were doubly stigmatized because of both their ethnic and sectarian orientations.
Memories of the bloody suppression of the Koc¸giri and Dersim rebellions had cre-
ated an unrecoverable gap between these groups and the Republican establishment.
This ethnic difference also created a gap between these two groups, which is still a
source of separation and an unsettled debate within the post-1990 Alevi movement.
While the public discourses of the former group are in general supportive of
Atat€urk and his reforms, those of the latter group are more critical and to a certain
extent hostile.
Republican policies of ethnic homogenization and religious sterilization used reli-
gion as a glue to connect ethnically diverse groups in Turkey as part of a fabricated
ethno-territorial identity, but the content and the form of the religion was re-shaped
according to an individualist and centrally organized notion of ‘official Islam’. The
groups with communal ties such as the dervish orders and Alevi communities
remained in the margins of this ideal definition of ‘imagined Turk’ as well as
‘sterilized Turkish Islam’. While the ethnic background and cultural traditions of
Alevi-Bektas¸is are appreciated for being authentically Turkish, their communal ties
and heterodox understanding of Islam were regarded as contradicting this modernist
identity-building project.
The failure of the Kemalist project of creating a non-political Turkish Islam was
an important turning point for Alevis’ perception of the Republican regime. The
Kemalist establishment decided to loosen its control on Islamic activities starting
from the mid-1940s, ending a tacit contract between Alevis and the Republican
regime after the 1950s. Alevis felt frustrated after the return of religion, mainly of
Sunni Islam, to the political and public sphere. Starting from the 1960s, a more
pragmatic relationship between Alevis and the Kemalist state establishment
emerged against the rising political Islam and this pragmatic relationship was reju-
venated during the late 1990s. The creation of a group of loyal supporters among
Alevi-Bektas¸i communities can be considered as a success story for the Kemalist
establishment; however, as emphasized in this study, this support was at best partial
as well as conditional. The Alevi revival of the late 1980s also signified the failure of
the project of creating a homogenous ethnicity and homogenous understanding of
religion.
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1. Cemevimeans house of gathering, it is not a place of worship in the strict sense but Alevi citizens per-
form their communal and religious rituals in cemevis.
2. The period starting from late 1980s has often been delineated as an ‘Alevi revival’, where Alevi citi-
zens started to mobilize socially and politically as an identity movement to gain cultural and political
rights. M. van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey’, Middle East Report,
Vol.200 (1996), p.7.
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Eastern Studies, Vol.36, No.3 (2000), pp.1–22.
4. L. Neyzi, Ben Kimim? T€urkiye’de S€ozl€u Tarih, Kimlik €Oznellik (_Istanbul: _Iletis¸im Yayınları, 2004),
pp.8–145.
5. The bloody suppression of the Dersim rebellion is one of the unsettled emotional issues in Alevi pub-
lic memory. The rebellion was suppressed with the extensive use of military power. According to offi-
cial records (13,160 people died and more than 10,000 people were exiled as a consequence of
military operations to suppress the rebellion. M. Pervin, ‘Dersim 1938 Gerc¸egi’, Sabah, 19 Nov.
2009; M. Kalman, Belge ve Tanıklarıyla Dersim Direnis¸leri (_Istanbul: Nujen Yayınları, 1995).
6. On the debates about definitions of Alevi identity and its social and policitcal implications, see
T. K€ose, ‘Ideological or Religious? Contending Visions on the Future of Alevi Identity’, Identities:
Global Studies on Culture and Power, Vol.19, No.5 (2012), pp.576–96.
7. Examples of this narrative can be found in many of the popular books on Alevism, mostly written by
Alevi authors. For a few examples, see B. €Oz, Kurtulus¸ Savas¸ında Alevi-Bektas¸iler, 10th ed. (_Istanbul:
Can Yayınları, 2003); C. S¸ener, Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal Bir Bas¸kaldırının Kısa Tarihc¸esi, 35th ed.
(_Istanbul: Etik Yayınları, 2004); C. S¸ener, Atat€urk ve Aleviler: Kurtulus¸ Savas¸ında Aleviler Bektas¸iler,
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(eds.), Secularisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp.58–75; A. Davison, ‘Turkey, a
“Secular” State? The Challenges of Description’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2/3
(2003), pp.333–50.
9. Parla and Davison, ‘Secularism and Laicism in Turkey’, p.62.
10. Ernest Gellner defined ‘high Islam’ as a tradition based on unitarianism, scripturalism, individualism
and puritanism. E. Gellner, ‘The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective’, in S. Bozdogan
and R. Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1997), pp.233–45.
11. According to Gellner, folk tradition is oriented towards saint cults, ecstatics, unpuritanical and have
component of ethnic loyalty. Gellner, ‘The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective’, 234
12. P.A. Andrews and R. Benninghaus (eds.), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaden:
Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp.117–23; A. G€okalp, ‘Alevisme Nomade: des Communautes de
Statue a L’identite Communautaire’, in Andrews and Benninghaus (eds.), Ethnic Groups in the
Republic of Turkey, pp.524–38; M. van Bruinessen, ‘Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir! The Debate on
the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevis’, in K. Kehl-Bodrogi (ed.), Syncretic Religious Communities
in the Near East (Leiden: Brill,1998), pp.1–25.
13. Kurmanji and Zazaki are the dialects of the Kurdish language that are popularly spoken in the east
and south-east regions of Turkey.
14. H. K€uc¸€uk, The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey’s National Struggle (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p.125.
15. H€ulya K€uc¸€uk argues that there is no concrete evidence of their being Bektas¸i except for Talat Pas¸a’s
writings. Ibid., p.219.
16. Ibid., p.127.
17. E. Massicard, T€urkiye’den Avrupa’ya Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallas¸ması (_Istanbul: _Iletis¸im Yayınları,
2007), p.57.
18. Hans L. Kieser, ‘Alevis, Armenians and Kurds in Unionist-Kemalist Turkey (1908–1938)’, in P.J.
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2003), p.178.
604 T. Kose
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
sta
nb
ul 
Se
hir
 U
ni]
 at
 05
:43
 28
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
19. Ibid.
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23. Sait’s research was published in the journal ‘T€urk Yurdu’, after the establishment of the Republic in
1926–27.
24. Ibid., 24.
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32. K€uc¸€uk, The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey’s National Struggle, pp.214–17.
33. Kieser, ‘Alevis, Armenians and Kurds in Unionist-Kemalist Turkey (1908–1938)’, p.184.
34. K€uc¸€uk, The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey’s National Struggle, p.217.
35. Kieser, ‘Alevis, Armenians and Kurds in Unionist-Kemalist Turkey (1908–1938)’, p.187.
36. Kemalist Alevi authors tend to adopt this storyline rather than interpreting the event as a sectarian
confrontation that is related to Alevi identity. For example, see S¸ener, €Oz and Zelyut’s books that
are mentioned above.
37. Kalman, Belge ve Tanıklarıyla Dersim Direnis¸leri, pp.164–8; B. €Oz, Dersim Olayı (_Istanbul:
Can Yayınları, 2004), p.135.
38. Dersimi, ‘K€urdistan Tarihinde Dersim’.
39. Dersimi, ‘K€urdistan Tarihinde Dersim’.
40. In the 18th footnote of his study van Bruinessen gives some official sources he wished to keep anony-
mous. Many of the graphic accounts of violence related to the event were from Dersimi’s book, which
can be considered to be an exaggerated and ideologically Kurdish ethno-nationalistic account.
41. Dersimi, ‘Ku
̈
rdistan Tarihinde Dersim’, p.4.
42. Fuat Bozkurt quotes from the memoirs of Minister of Foreign Affairs _Ihsan Sabri C¸aglayangil,
F. Bozkurt, C¸agdas¸las¸ma S€urecinde Alevilik (_Istanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2005), pp.73–6.
43. Yezit was the Umayyad caliph who sent forces against Husayin and his followers in Karbala, Iraq, in
680, resulting in their martyrdom.
44. Atat€urk passed away on 10 November 1938.
45. In the second section of his book, Cumhuriyet T€urkiye’sinde Bir Mesele Olarak _Isla^m, 3rd ed.
(_Istanbul: Derga^h Yayınları, 2009), Ismail Kara elaborates on the complicated relationship of Islamic
communities (cemaats) and religious orders (tariqats) within the Republican establishment. This rela-
tionship was more complicated than an interaction based on total denial or total submission
(pp.179–346).
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